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Abstract
A methodology for system-level hardware verication based on compositional model check-
ing is described. This methodology relies on a simple set of proof techniques, and a domain
specic strategy for applying them. The goal of this strategy is to reduce the verication of a
large system to nite state subgoals that are tractable in both size and number. These subgoals
are then discharged by model checking. The proof strategy uses proof techniques for design
renement, temporal case splitting, data-type reduction and the exploitation of symmetry. Unin-
terpreted functions can be used to abstract operations on data. A proof system supporting this
approach generates verication subgoals to be discharged by the SMV symbolic model checker.
Application of the methodology is illustrated using an implementation of Tomasulo’s algorithm,
a packet buering device and a cache coherence protocol as examples. c© 2000 Published by
Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Hardware verication; Design renement; Compositional model checking; Symbolic
model checking; Data type reduction; Symmetry; Uninterpreted functions; SMV; Tomasulo’s
algorithm; Cache coherence protocol
1. Introduction
Formal methods for hardware verication divide into two broad categories. One set
of methods is based on model checking and related techniques for nite state machine
verication. The other is based on automated proof assistants. Model checking methods
have the advantage that they can automatically verify a fairly broad class of properties
| those expressible in temporal logic, or as the language of an automaton. They
also can provide behavioral counterexamples in case a property is false. This can
only be done, however, only in the case where the state space of the system being
veried is relatively small. Realistically if the model being veried has 50 or 100
bits of state information, it is likely that it can be successfully veried (though not
certain). On the other hand, with 500{1000 bits of state information, the chance of
successful verication is slight. This is because model checking methods are based on
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exhaustively searching the model’s state space, either explicitly or implicitly. Thus,
one can use model checking methods to verify, for example, fairly complex nite state
control circuits, or highly abstracted models of protocols, but not in general circuits that
have large data paths or memories. While progress continues to be made in extending
model checking to larger systems, real integrated systems are still several orders of
magnitude too large to be veried in their entirety by model checking, and there is
little prospect that this gap will close.
Theorem proving methods, on the other hand, impose no a priori limit on the size or
complexity of the system that can be veried. One has, in principle, the possibility of
breaking down proofs about very large systems into proofs about smaller components,
and thus controlling the complexity of the verication process. However, eective au-
tomation for handling the detailed aspects of the proof has been lacking. As a result,
when using a proof assistant, one is typically obliged to posit inductive invariants of
the system, which can be quite detailed. Proving these invariants may involve inter-
actively constructing very detailed proof scripts, in which the user guides the prover
through an extensive case analysis. Inductive invariants and proofs scripts must also
be maintained as the design changes.
It is natural to suppose that a synthesis of the two verication styles could be made,
whereby the details of the proof are handled automatically by a model checker, while
the reasoning at a more abstract level is handled by a proof assistant. In fact, some
work has been done on integrating model checking algorithms into the framework of
a theorem prover [24]. However, integration of theorem proving and model checking
tools is not sucient by itself to provide a practical method of verication. One also
requires a proof methodology that naturally yields proof subgoals veriable by model
checking. These subgoals must be reasonably small in number, and the state spaces
involved must be small enough to allow a high condence that model checking can
be completed successfully.
The purpose of this article is to propose such a methodology, for the particular do-
main of hardware verication. The proof strategy is based on a small collection of
techniques used to reduce large (possibly innite state) verication problems to small
nite state problems. These techniques have been implemented in a special-purpose
proof system that produces nite state verication subgoals to be discharged by the
SMV model checker [18]. The system to be veried, its specication, and the proof
itself are all expressed in a somewhat extended hardware description language. Poten-
tially, however, a similar system could be implemented as a \tactic" within a general
purpose proof assistant. It should be noted that the process of proof decomposition
is not automatic. It is aided by automatic tools, but requires human insight about the
structure and function of the design being veried.
1.1. The scope of this article
This article is intended to provide an overview of a methodology, as opposed to
a rigorous formal treatment. Thus, while proof techniques are introduced here in the
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abstract, we will not consider in detail the underlying model theory or prove that the
techniques are sound in a given theory. These or similar techniques could be derived
in many contexts. The intention here is to motivate the approach intuitively, and to
illustrate by example a strategy by which the various techniques can be combined to
reduce the verication of complex systems to small model checking problems.
We will begin, in the next section, with a discussion of the overall proof strategy
in general terms. Following that, the method is illustrated by application to a simple
implementation of Tomasulo’s algorithm [26], a technique of implementing out-of-order
execution in instruction set processors. This will provide a more detailed view of how
the methodology is supported by the SMV model checking system. There follows a
less detailed discussion of two additional examples, a communications application and
the cache coherence system of a multiprocessor. Details of these examples are omitted,
as they are intended principally to show by example that the methodology generalizes
to systems other than instruction processors. A discussion of related work is postponed
to the end of the article, to allow a more meaningful comparison of techniques.
1.2. Preliminaries
Temporal logic is a logical language commonly used for expressing properties of
concurrent systems. Here, we will use the variant called linear temporal logic or LTL.
In its propositional version it allows the usual propositional operators (and, or and not)
and in additional a collection of temporal operators used to express relations in time.
For example, given a proposition p, the formula Fp is true at a given time if p is
true at some time in the future, the formula Gp is true when p holds at all times in
the future, and Xp is true when p holds at the next time instant (assuming time is
discrete). The formula pU q is true at a given time if q holds at some instant in the
future, and p holds at all times up to, but not necessarily including, that instant.
In LTL, a model is an innite sequence s0; s1; : : : of states, representing consecutive
time instants. Each formula is either true or false in a given state. We write (M; si) j= 
if the formula  is true in state si of model M . Thus, for example:
(M; si) j=X i (M; si+1) j=
(M; si) j=U  i for some j>i;
(M; sj) j=  and for all i6k<j; (M; sk) j=
We say a model satises a formula, and write M j=, when the formula is true in the
initial state (that is, when (M; s0) j=). If a formula is true in all models, we say it is
valid and write j=. The decision problem is to determine whether a given formula is
valid. Given a nite-state graph, the model checking problem is to determine whether
the formula is true for all paths in the state graph starting with an initial state. For
propositional LTL, both these problems are PSPACE complete, and can be solved in
time exponential in the formula size [16, 29]. In the model checking case, the time
used is linear in the size of the state graph, and exponential in the formula size. In
practice, there is little operational distinction between validity checking (truth in all
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models) and model checking (truth in all paths in a state graph), since the state graph
itself is usually characterized implicitly by a logical formula. The most important factor
in the complexity of model checking nite state systems tends to be the number of
reachable states, that is, feasible combinations of the state variables used to model the
system. Since the number of reachable states can be exponential in the number of state
variables, model checking is only eective in practice for models with a relatively
small number of state variables.
2. Proof strategy
We now outline a proof strategy, based on a set of somewhat domain specic proof
techniques, that is intended to reduce the verication of large, complex hardware sys-
tems to subproblems with few enough state variables to be veriable by model check-
ing. The overall approach is to verify that an abstract model, acting as the system
specication, is implemented by some more detailed system model. Implementation is
dened in terms of renement relations that relate signaling behavior at suitable points
in the implementation with events occurring in the abstract model. This situation is de-
picted in Fig. 1. Typically, the abstract model, the implementation and the renement
relations are all expressed in the same HDL-like language, as sets of equations that may
involve time delay. Formally, these are all viewed as \syntactic sugar" for properties
in temporal logic.
The renement relations decompose the verication problem into smaller parts for
separate, localized, verication. This is the most basic way in which large proofs are
broken into smaller proofs. To do this, we rely on a technique of circular composi-
tional proof which allows us to assume that one relation holds true while verifying
another, and vice versa. In eect, the renement relations allow us to use the abstract
model as a context for verifying local components of the detailed model. Thus, we
Fig. 1. Compositional renement verication.
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avoid the dicult problem of verifying components of the design in an unconstrained
environment.
Having made a macro level decomposition of the problem by renement relations,
one is then commonly left with large data structures, such as memories or register les.
These generally cannot be handled directly by a model checker because they have a
large number of state bits. However, we can often reduce the model down to just
one or two components of the larger structure by means of temporal case splitting.
Using this technique, we can verify separately only those data items that pass through
a given xed element of a large array, and thus greatly reduce the number of state bits
in the model checking problem. This technique is called path splitting. It allows us to
consider individually every path that a data item might take through a given system,
and to reduce the number of state variables in the model checking problem accordingly.
Use of renement relations and path splitting can result in a very large number of
individual cases to verify (each of which yields a model checking problem). We can
often reduce these to a small, representative number of cases, however, by exploiting
symmetry. The implementation of this technique in the SMV proof system is based on
the use of symmetric data types called scalarsets, borrowed from the Murphi system
[12]. Type checking ensures that a scalarset variable is used only in symmetric ways,
guaranteeing that the truth of a given formula is invariant under permutations of the
scalarset type. This allows a symmetry reduction to reduce a large (or even innite)
parameterized class of proof subgoals to just a few representative cases. Note that
symmetry is not used here to reduce state-space size, as it is in the Murphi system.
Finally, after the large arrays have been reduced to their individual components, one
may still be left with large data types, such as addresses, or data words. Note that
\large" here means that the type has a large number of possible values, not that it
requires a large amount of storage space. In this case, a data-type reduction can be
used. This reduces a large (perhaps innite) type to a small nite one, containing only
one or two values that are of interest for the case being veried. The remaining values
are represented by a single abstract value. Thus, data types represented by 32 or 64
bits can be reduced to just one or two bits for the purpose of model checking.
The above elements can be assembled into a general proof strategy for hardware
designs. Using this approach, one can reduce the verication of a large and complex
system down to nite state verication problems with small numbers of state bits.
When the number of state bits in each proof subgoal is suciently small, verication
can proceed in a completely automated way without further manual intervention. Thus,
we do not rely on a powerful model checker to handle very large problems (though this
can be useful), but rather on our ability to decompose large verication problems into
small ones. Nonetheless, model checking is still a crucial component of this strategy.
The application of model checking relieves the user of responsibility for the details
of the proof, in particular of the need to write inductive invariants. The result is a
scalable, practical methodology for system level hardware verication.
We will now consider in a little more detail the various proof techniques described
above, and how they are combined in a global proof strategy.
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2.1. Renement and circular compositional proofs
As mentioned above, in renement verication, we specify a collection of temporal
properties called renement relations. These relate the behavior of a simple abstract
model to a more complex and detailed implementation. While renement relations can
be arbitrary temporal properties, in practice they usually are downward translations,
mapping events or data in the abstract model to corresponding signaling sequences at
some chosen point in the implementation. Thus, for example, in Fig. 1, the temporal
property 1 denes the legal behaviors of signal A, as a function of the abstract model,
while 2 denes the legal behaviors of signal B.
The renement relations, once specied, can be used to break the verication problem
into smaller parts. For example, when we verify that signal B satises specication
2, we simply assume that signal A satises 1. This allows us to abstract away
unit U2. In eect, the asbtract model becomes the \environment" for verifying unit
U1. Similarly, when verifying that signal A satises property 1, we assume 2 and
abstract away unit U1. This approach solves a signicant practical problem in system
level verication. That is, we often cannot verify any useful properties of a given unit
in a unconstrained environment. In this case, the abstract model provides the necessary
environment constraints, by way of the renement relations.
Note that, on the face of it, this reasoning is circular, since we have assumed 1
to prove 2, and assumed 2 to prove 1. However, there is a way of stating this
argument which is in fact logically sound. To do this, we break the circularity by
induction over time. When we prove that property 2 holds at time t, we assume that
1 holds at all times from 0 up to t−1. Similarly, to prove that 1 holds at time
t, we assume that 2 holds at all times from 0 up to t−1. We can then infer by
induction over time that both 1 and 2 hold for all time t. Schematically, we make
the following inference:
1 up to t−1)2 up to t
2 up to t−1)1 up to t
for all t; 1 and 2
The two statements above the line, which we must prove, can be written succinctly in
linear temporal logic, as follows:
:(1 U :2)
:(2 U :1)
Since we can state these propositions in linear temporal logic, we can verify them by
model checking. In essence, these two proof subgoals state that neither 1 nor 2 is
the rst to be false. It follows trivially that both must be true at all times. That is, we
can infer G1 and G2. In fact, this is true for any temporal properties 1 and 2,
including \liveness" properties (properties that state some progress condition that must
eventually occur). We prove the rst subgoal using only unit U1, and the second using
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only unit U2. This results in two model checking problems with reduced state spaces,
since the state variables of U2 can be ignored when verifying U1, and vice versa.
This circular compositional proof principle can be generalized to any number of re-
nement relations. In general, if we have some collection of properties Gi to prove,
we can choose for each i an arbitrary subset i of the properties to act as its \envi-
ronment abstraction". If we can verify for every i that
:(i U :i)
we can infer that Gi holds for all i. In eect, to prove each property i at time t, we
assume that the properties in i hold up to time t−1. We can, of course, also assume an
arbitrary subset  i of the properties dening the implementation. Thus, we verify that
 i):(i U :i)
To use the circular compositional technique to verify a collection of renement rela-
tions, the user need only specify an \environment" for proving each relation, in terms
of i and  i. In practice, as we will see later, only a small subset of the environment
needs to be specied explicitly. The rest can be inferred using heuristics, including a
\cone of inuence" analysis.
2.1.1. Circular compositional reasoning with combinational paths
It may happen that assuming 1 up to time t−1 when proving 2 is not sucient.
This might be the case, for example, if the unit U1 contained a combinational logic
path from its input A to its output B. In this case, a change in A would be reected
at B with no intervening delay. Thus, it might be necessary to assume that 1 holds
up to and including time t to prove correctness of 2 at time t.
This can be done by slightly generalizing the circular compositional proof technique.
First, we put all of the properties i into a well-founded order that reects the com-
binational dependency relation between the signals. For example, if signal B depends
on A via some zero delay path (but not the other way around), then we say 1<2.
If 1<2, we can assume 1 up to time t when proving 2 at time t, otherwise we
assume 1 only up to time t−1. That is, given an \environment abstraction" i for
property i, let i be the subset of properties in i that are less than i in the order
(and thus assumed up to time t). It is then sucient to prove for every i that:
 i):(i U (i ^:i))
to infer Gi for all i. In essence, we show that no property i is the rst to fail,
where \rst" is determined primarily by time, but in case of a tie is determined by
the given well-founded order on the properties. It follows that no property ever fails.
Note once again that because the proof subgoals are expressed in temporal logic, they
can be veried directly by model checking.
It should also be noted that the above proof goals are generated automatically by
the proof system and not written by the user. The user supplies only the renement
relations. Further, the distinction between i and i is for the most part invisible to
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the user. The proof system makes this distinction automatically, based on a data-ow
analysis of the system.
2.2. Auxiliary state
A useful strategy in dening renement relations is to add auxiliary state informa-
tion to the design. Usually, an auxiliary state variable is associated with a particular
component of the design. It carries either the correct value of the data stored in that
component (according to the abstract model) or a pointer to that value in the abstract
model. When introducing denitions of auxiliary variables, we must ensure that adding
these denitions does not aect the truth value of propositions about existing imple-
mentation variables. Thus, if we can prove a property using some auxiliary denitions,
we know that the property remains true when the auxiliary denitions are removed.
This principle is known as \conservative extension".
Typically, conservative extension is ensured in a theorem proving system by requiring
that each new denition introduces a new object never before referenced. However, it
is useful to be able to write auxiliary denitions that are mutually dependent, provided
conservative extension can be guaranteed (for example, this is useful for dening the
internal state of abstract models).
In the SMV system, a signal denition is a nondeterministic assignment. This as-
signment gives the set of possible values for the signal at time t, as a function of
other signals at time t, or time t−1. The former case is referred to as a zero delay
assignment, while the latter case is referred to as a unit delay assignment. Formally,
these are both just special cases of temporal properties. SMV guarantees conservative
extension by enforcing the following rules:
 No implementation signal depends on an auxiliary signal.
 Each auxiliary signal is assigned only once.
 Every dependency cycle in the auxiliary signal assignments is broken by a unit
delay.
Within the above rules, the user is free to introduce any number of auxiliary signals,
arbitrarily dened, in no particular order. The rules ensure that for any implementation
behavior, we can compute at least one behavior of the auxiliary signals that satises
the auxiliary denitions. This allows us to make the following inference:
( ^A))
 )9vA :
where A is the set of auxiliary denitions, and vA is the set of auxiliary variables.
That is, if we can prove a property  using the implementation   and the auxiliary
denitions A, then it follows that every implementation behavior satises  for some
valuation of the auxiliary signals. The auxiliary denitions provide the \witness" for
this existential quantier.
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Note that this use of auxiliary variables is essentially the same as that introduced by
Owicki and Gries [21]. The primary dierence is that, in the Owicki and Gries method,
the auxiliary variables are dened by statements added to a sequential program, whereas
here they are introduced by signal assignments.
3. Temporal case splitting
Recall that our overall goal is to reduce a large verication problem down to small
nite state problems. Having decomposed the verication problem into localized sub-
problems, using renement relations and auxiliary state, the next problem that usually
arises is the presence of large structures, such as register les, memories, FIFO buers,
etc. The number of state bits in these structures is often too large to handle them in
their entirety with model checking. We solve this problem by splitting the verication
subgoals into cases, where each case corresponds to just one element in a large struc-
ture (for example, just one memory address). Typically, this means that when verifying
that correct data appear at the output of a given unit containing a register le, we will
consider only the correctness of those data items that happen to have been stored in
register i. When verifying the property for a particular value of i, we can abstract away
the other elements of the register le, giving them an undened value. The state space
of the resulting model checking problem is thus reduced, since it involves only one
register instead of many. This situation is depicted in Fig. 2.
To verify the correctness of only those data items that pass through a particular
element in a large structure, we use temporal case splitting. This method is used to
prove that a particular property  holds at all times. It breaks the proof into cases
based on the value of a given variable v. For each possible value i of v, we show that
Fig. 2. Path splitting.
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 is true at just those times when v= i. Since at all times v must have some value,
we can then infer that  must be true at all times. Thus, if we can prove separately
for each i that G((v= i))), we can infer G.
Typically, v is an auxiliary variable which keeps track of the location in some large
data structure which was used to store a given item appearing at a unit output. In some
cases, such a variable may already be present in the implementation (for example, the
address eld on a bus indicates which memory cell a given data item was obtained
from). By case splitting, we obtain one proof subgoal for each possible value i of v.
Each case requires that property  hold at those times when v= i (for example, those
times when the current data item passed through memory location i). Thus, to prove
each case, we commonly need to use the implementation denition of just one cell in
the array. In eect, we have decomposed a large array into its individual components
for the purposes of verication. This technique might be referred to as \path splitting",
since we prove one case for each possible path that a given data item might take
through a system.
4. Symmetry reductions
Clearly, the path splitting approach trades o a problem of state explosion for a
problem of case explosion. For example, to prove a property of a memory of 232 bytes,
we would have 232 separate cases to prove. Or, suppose that a data item entering a
unit is stored rst in element i of register le A, and then in element j of register le
B, before being sent to an output. Here, we have two case splits to perform, yielding
O(n2) cases to prove, where n is the number of registers in each le. Verifying all of
these cases would be wasteful, since it is likely that most of the cases are isomorphic.
In other words, we should be able to prove just one case (say, i=0, j=0) and then
infer all of the other cases \by symmetry".
In fact, this is possible, provided we make the symmetry in the system explicit. In
the SMV system, this is done by means of symmetric data types called scalarsets [12].
Restrictions on the use of scalarset types ensure that the semantics of all assertions is
invariant under permutations of values of a scalarset type. That is, we can swap the
roles of any two constants of the type, without changing the truth value of a given
formula. This property is enforced by means of type checking rules. In practice, this
means that scalarset variables can be compared for equality against variables of the
same type, but no other operations may be applied to them. In addition, they may be
used as array indices, and arrays or functions over scalarset types may be \summed"
using any commutative-associative operator. For example, we can form the logical
conjunction of p(i), for all i, where i is of scalarset type. Any other use of a scalarset
variable breaks the symmetry of the type. In particular, individual constants of scalarset
types may not be directly introduced without breaking the symmetry.
Now suppose that we have split a property into cases based on the value i of a
scalarset variable v, and that we have proved the case i=0. We can then infer that the
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case i=1 holds as well, since we obtain the case i=0 from i=1 by simply transposing
the values 0 and 1 of the scalarset type. We know that the truth value of formulas
is invariant under such permutations. The same argument holds for all other values of
the type. Thus, it is sucient to prove just one case, say i=0, to infer all the others
by symmetry.
Carrying on, if we split cases based on two values i and j, of the same scalarset
type, then it is sucient to prove cases i=0; j=0 and i=0; j=1. All the cases
where i= j can be reduced to the former by permuting scalarset values, while all the
cases where i 6= j can be reduced to the latter. In general, if  has some free pa-
rameter i of a scalarset type, and if  contains the constants 0 : : : k − 1 of the given
type, it is sucient to prove  for the cases i=0 : : : k to infer that  holds for all i.
The idea is that all cases i>k are equivalent to i= k, by simply exchanging the con-
stants i and k. As a result, if we have n parameters of a given scalarset type, then
after applying the above reduction n times we will have n! subgoals to prove (for the
rst parameter, k =0, for the second k =1 and so on). For example, if we have split
cases on three addresses, ranging from 0 to 232 − 1, then we will have 3!= 6 sub-
goals to prove instead of the 232 232 232 subgoals we would have without symmetry
reduction.
In order to use symmetry reduction in practice, we have only to specify the scalarset
types of the variables. A representative set of cases for each property can then be
generated automatically by the proof system.
5. Data-type reductions
Up to this point, we have seen how to break the verication of large systems down
to more localized subgoals by specifying renement relations. The large structures are
then broken down into their individual elements by path splitting, and the resulting
large number of cases is reduced to a tractable number by symmetry considerations.
At this point, there usually remains one additional impediment to obtaining tractably
small state spaces for model checking. That is the presence of types with large (or
innite) ranges, such as addresses and data words.
Large data types are dealt with by reducing them to smaller abstract types. For
example, if we are proving case v= i of a property, where v is of a given type T , then
we might reduce type T to just two values: the specic value i that we are interested
in, and an abstract value Tni to represent all the other values in the type. A variable
of the reduced type can thus be represented by a single bit.
Having abstracted the model in this way, we use a corresponding abstract interpre-
tation of formulas. This interpretation guarantees that any property that is true in the
reduced model is also true in the original model (that is, it is a \conservative abstrac-
tion"). For example, consider the equality comparison operation. In order to obtain a
290 K.L. McMillan / Science of Computer Programming 37 (2000) 279{309
conservative abstraction, we use the following truth table for equality:
That is, clearly the specic value i is equal to itself, and not equal Tni, since this
represents all the values not equal to i. However, two values not equal to i may
themselves be equal or unequal. The abstraction does not present enough information
to make the distinction. Thus, to be conservative, the result of comparing Tni and Tni
for equality is the unknown value ?. With this interpretation, we can be sure that a
property veried on the model with the reduced type is also true of the unreduced
model. It is possible, however, for the truth value of a formula in the reduced model
to be ?, in which case we obtain no information about the formula.
In practice, an appropriate data-type reduction for a given type can often be inferred
automatically, based on the particular case being veried. For example, if the case we
are verifying has two parameters, i and j, both of type T , then by default type T would
be reduced to the set fi; jg, plus an abstract value.
5.1. Summary
In summary, we have seen a collection of proof techniques designed to be used in
a general strategy for hardware verication. Their primary purpose is to reduce the
verication of large systems to a small number of tractable model checking problems.
The framework of the proof strategy is renement verication. Here, we specify the
behavior of a system with respect to an abstract model, by means of renement re-
lations, or translations from abstract to detailed behavior. Renement relations can be
introduced as needed to divide the global verication problem into localized subprob-
lems. In each subproblem, a part of the implementation is veried in the environment
of the abstract model, with the renement relations acting as intermediary. A method
of circular compositional proof makes this style of proof decomposition possible.
For pure control logic, this style of structural decomposition is often sucient to
reduce the verication to small nite state subgoals. However, for designs with data,
additional reductions are required. First, the large structures, such as memories and
FIFO buers, are divided into their individual elements by means of path splitting.
This allows us to consider each possible path that a data item might take through a
system as a separate case, and thus allows us to abstract away all but a few elements
of the large structures. The large number of resulting cases is then reduced to a few
representative cases by means of symmetry reduction, which relies on the use of
symmetric data types called scalarsets.
Finally, the types with large or innite ranges (such as memory addresses, or packet
identiers) are reduced to small nite types by means of a data-type reduction. A
K.L. McMillan / Science of Computer Programming 37 (2000) 279{309 291
suitable abstract interpretation of operators guarantees that the reduced model is a
conservative abstraction of the original. The result is a set of proof subgoals whose
models are small enough to handle directly with model checking.
6. Verifying a version of Tomasulo’s algorithm
In this section, we will see a concrete example of how the above strategy can be
applied to reduce a large verication problem to tractable nite state proof subgoals.
6.1. Tomasulo’s algorithm
Tomasulo’s algorithm [26] allows an instruction set processor to execute instructions
in data-ow order, rather than sequential order. This can increase the throughput of the
unit, by allowing instructions to be processed in parallel, or avoiding pipeline stalls
due to hazards. Each pending instruction is held in a \reservation station" until the
values of its operands become available, then issued \out-of-order".
The ow of instructions in our implementation of Tomasulo’s algorithm is pictured
in Fig. 3. Each instruction, as it arrives, fetches its two operands from a special reg-
ister le. Each register in this le holds either an actual value, or a \tag" indicating
the reservation station that will produce the register value when it completes. The in-
struction and its operands (either values or tags) are stored in a reservation station.
The reservation station watches the results returning from the execution pipelines, and
when a result’s tag matches one of its operands, it records the value in place of the
tag. When the reservation station has the values of both of its operands, it may is-
sue its instruction to an execution pipeline. When the tagged result returns from the
pipeline, the reservation station is cleared, and the result value, if needed, is stored in
the destination register. However, if a subsequent instruction has modied the register
tag, the result is discarded. This is because its value in a sequential execution would
be overwritten.
In addition to ALU instructions, our implementation includes instructions that read
register values to an external output and write values from an external input. There
is also a \stall" output, indicating that an instruction cannot currently be received. A
stall can happen either because there is no available reservation station to store the
instruction, or because the value of the register to be read to an output is not yet
available.
6.2. Structural decomposition
To specify our machine, we begin by writing an abstract model. The abstract model
is a simple implementation of the instruction set that executes the instructions one at
a time in sequence (this is commonly referred to as an \instruction set architecture"
model). The abstract model is shown schematically in Fig. 4. In this case, the input
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Fig. 3. Flow of instructions in Tomasulo’s algorithm.
Fig. 4. Instruction set architecture model.
and output signals of the abstract model and the implementation are the same, so there
is no need to write renement relations for them.
Typically, the rst decomposition one makes when verifying an instruction set pro-
cessor is to break the problem into two lemmas. The rst states that operands fetched
for instructions are correct, while the second states that the results produced from these
operands are correct. Each of these lemmas is a renement relation. In this case, the
rst relation species the operand values stored in the reservation stations, while the
second species the values returning on the result bus from the execution units. Natu-
rally, we apply circular compositional proof, using operand correctness to prove result
correctness and result correctness to prove operand correctness.
The use of these two renement relations divides the verication of our instruction
set processor fairly neatly in two parts. When proving that the fetched operands are
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Fig. 5. Decomposition by means of renement relations.
correct, we use the result renement relation to specify the result bus. This eliminates
from the proof all of the logic involved in issuing instructions to the execution units,
the execution units themselves, and the completion logic that routes execution results
onto the result bus. This logic is removed from the model automatically by data ow
analysis. That is, when we choose to dene the result bus values according to the
renement relation, the dependency of this bus on the execution unit logic is eliminated.
A so-called \cone of inuence" reduction therefore removes this logic from the model,
on the grounds that it cannot inuence the model checking result. The resulting system
abstraction is depicted in Fig. 5. Conversely, when the result correctness lemma is
proved, we assume that the operands fetched by the reservation stations are correct,
and hence we eliminate all of the operand fetch logic and the register le from the
model.
6.2.1. Auxiliary state
In order to be able to specify renement relations for the operand and result values,
we need to know what the correct values for these data items actually are. We obtain
this information by adding auxiliary state to the model. In this case, our auxiliary state
variables record the correct values of the operands and result of each instruction, as
computed by the abstract model. These values are recorded at the time an instruction
enters the machine and is stored in a reservation station. This operation is depicted
in Fig. 6, along with the SMV assignments that implement it. For the auxiliary state,
we use an array aux with one element per reservation station. The signal st indicates
the reservation station in which the incoming instruction is being stored. Thus, if the
machine does not stall, and if the incoming instruction is an ALU operation (meaning
it is destined for an execution unit), then we store in the auxiliary array the correct
values of the two operands (opra and oprb) and the result res from the abstract
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Fig. 6. Auxiliary state derived from abstract model.
model. Storing these values will allow us to verify that the actual operands and results
we eventually obtain are correct. As mentioned earlier, assignments are just a special
case of temporal properties. In this case, we have unit delay assignments, which specify
the next value of a signal as a function of the current values of some other signals. Also
note that, as aux is an auxiliary signal, the implementation is not allowed to refer to it.
In SMV, the renement relations themselves are normally also written as assign-
ments. They could be written as arbitrary temporal formulas, but the assignment form
has the advantage that we can readily determine which signals each signal depends on
when performing the \cone of inuence" computation. These assignments are special,
however, in that they are properties to be proved, and not part of the implementation.
They are grouped into named collections called layers. Layers have a special function
in the \design by renement" mechanism of SMV [20], but for present purposes can be
thought of as simply collections of properties to be proved. In particular, it is possible
to specify many renement relations assigning the same signal, but only if they are
contained in dierent layers. Thus, we can uniquely identify a property to be proved
by specifying the name of the signal assigned, and the name of the layer containing
the assignment.
As an example, here is the SMV specication for the operand correctness layer (for
the opra operand):
forall(k in TAG)
layer lemma1 :
if(st[k].valid & st[k].opra.valid)
st[k].opra.val := aux[k].opra;
Here, TAG is the type of reservation station indices. Thus, for all reservation stations,
if the station is valid (contains an instruction) and its opra operand is a value (not a
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tag), then the value must be the correct operand value that we stored in the auxiliary
array aux. The result correctness lemma is just as simply stated:
forall (i in TAG)
layer lemma2[i] :
if(pout.tag = i & pout.valid)
pout.val := aux[i].res;
It says that, for all reservation stations i, if the tag of the returning result on the bus
pout is i, and if the result is valid, then its value must be the correct result value
for reservation station i, as stored in the auxiliary array aux. Note that in this case
we have dened an array of renement relations, one for each reservation station. All
specify the same signal, pout.val.
Also note that in these two renement relations, the only implementation signals that
we refer to are the reservation station operands, the reservation station valid bits, and the
result bus. There is no reference in the proof, for example, to the register le, the issue
logic, the execution units or the completion logic. As a result, this proof is likely to
be more robust with respect to small design changes than a proof that references many
signals. We will observe this later when introducing a \re-order buer" to the design.
6.3. Path splitting
Although the renement relations divide the implementation into two parts for the
purpose of verication, there are still large structures in the model that prevent us from
applying model checking at this point. These are the register le array, the reservation
station array and the execution unit array. Therefore, we break the verication problem
into cases, as a function of the particular path a data item takes when moving from
one renement relation to another.
Consider, for example, a value returning on the result bus. This result was produced
by some reservation station i (which we will call the producer). It then (possibly) gets
stored in a register j. Finally it is read as an operand for reservation station k (which
we will call the consumer). This suggests a case split which will reduce the size of the
verication problem for operand correctness to just two reservation stations and one
register. For each operand arriving at consumer reservation station k, we split cases
based on the producer reservation station i that it came from (this is indicated by the
\tag" of the operand) and on the register j that it passed through (this is the source
operand index for the given instruction). To prove this one case, we use just reservation
stations i and k, and register j. The other elements of these arrays are abstracted away
by assigning them undened values. This situation is depicted in Fig. 7.
To apply temporal case splitting in SMV, we use the following declaration (for the
opra operand):
forall (i,k in TAG; j in REG)
subcase lemma1[i][j]
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Fig. 7. Path splitting in Tomasulo’s algorithm.
of st[k].opra.val//lemma1
for st[k].opra.tag = i & aux[k].srca = j;
That is, for all consumer reservation stations k, we break the operand correctness
lemma into an array of cases (i; j), where i is the producer reservation station and
j is the source register. Note that we have to add an auxiliary variable to remember
source operand register srca, since the implementation does not store this information.
Verifying each case requires only one register and two reservation stations in the model.
Thus, we have eectively broken the large data structures down into their components
for verication purposes. For the result lemma a similar case splitting declaration can
be specied; we split cases on the producing reservation station of the result on the
bus, and the execution unit that computed it.
6.4. Exploiting symmetry
To verify the operand correctness lemma, we now have one case to prove for each
triple (i; j; k) where i; k are reservation stations and j is an element of the register le.
This could be a very large number indeed if, for example, there are 64 registers and
64 reservation stations. However, if all the registers are symmetric to on another, and
all the reservation stations are similarly symmetric, then two representative cases will
suce: one where i= k and one where i 6= k. To exploit the symmetry of the design
in this way in SMV, we declare the types of register indices and reservation station
indices to be scalarsets:
scalarset REG 0..63;
scalarset TAG 0..63;
When these declarations are made, the SMV proof system automatically chooses a
set of representative cases under symmetry. In this instance it chooses the cases
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(i=0; j=0; k =0) and (i=0; j=0; k =1). All of the remaining cases reduce to
one of these by permuting the scalarset types. Thus, we have reduced O(n3) cases to
just two.
Note that declaring types to be scalarsets means that we can use values of these
types as array indices, and we can compare them for equality, but we cannot perform
any other operations on them if we want to make use of symmetry reduction for these
types. Fortunately, these are (with one exception) the only operations that are required
on the index types, as no actual computation is performed on them. The exception is the
allocation of empty reservation stations for incoming instructions. This will typically
include some form of priority encoder, which will break the symmetry of reservation
station indices. However, for purposes of verifying the operand correctness lemma,
we do not need to use this logic in the environment { a completely nondeterministic
allocation policy will suce. Hence we do not break the symmetry when verifying
the lemma. In general, when applying symmetry reduction to a particular type, SMV
automatically excludes any assignments that break the symmetry of the type from
the environment. This guarantees that the proof subgoal we are checking obeys the
scalarset-type rules, and hence that the symmetry reduction is sound.
6.5. Innite state verication
Up to this point we have dened renement relations, used path splitting to decom-
pose the large structures, and applied symmetry to reduce the number of cases to a
tractable level. There remains, however, the issue of large types, in this case, the data
values and possibly the index types. To handle these, we use a data-type reduction to
reduce the types to small sets consisting a few \interesting" values (for the particular
case we are proving) and an abstract value to represent the rest. In fact, using data-type
reduction, we can verify our implementation for an arbitrary (or innite!) number of
registers and reservation stations. To do this, we simply declare the index types to be
scalarsets with undened range, as follows:
scalarset REG undefined;
scalarset TAG undefined;
When verifying the operand correctness lemma, for example, for a given case (i; j; k),
SMV will automatically reduce the type TAG to just three values: i, k and an abstract
value to represent the rest. Similarly, the type REG will be reduced to just two values:
j and an abstract value. As a result, in the model checker, only two bits will be used
to represent tags (enough to represent three values), while one bit will be used to
represent register indices.
Note that data-type reductions can also be specied manually, but in the present
case the default reductions are adequate, so no action needs to be taken by the
user.
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6.6. Uninterpreted functions
Finally, we come to the question of data values. Suppose, for example that the data
path is 64 bits wide. Although model checkers can handle some arithmetic operations
(such as addition and subtraction) at this width, they cannot typically handle others
(such as multiplication). Moreover, it would be better to verify our implementation
of Tomasulo’s algorithm generically, independent of the arithmetic operations imple-
mented by the instruction set. We can do this by introducing an uninterpreted function
symbol f for the ALU function. Assuming only that the abstract model and the imple-
mentation execution units compute the same function f, we should be able to prove
that our implementation is correct regardless of the ALU function. Using an uninter-
preted function symbol also has the advantage that the symmetry of data values is
not broken. Thus, we can apply symmetry reductions to data values, and as a result,
consider only a few representative cases of data values rather than all 264 possible
values.
To introduce an uninterpreted function in SMV, we simply declare an array to rep-
resent the lookup table of the function. Thus, if a and b are two operand values, then
f[a][b] is the result. Since the actual contents of the array are unspecied (except
that the contents do not change over time), all possible functions f are represented in
this way. We model ALU operations in both the abstract model and implementation
with lookups in the array f.
With this abstraction, we can easily deal with any size data word, by declaring the
type of data words to be a scalarset. In fact, we can leave the actual range of the type
undeclared, so that in principle we are verifying the implementation for any size data
type. We then use case splitting on the data values to reduce the problem to a nite
state problem. In particular, we verify the result correctness lemma for only the case
when the operands are some particular values a and b, and where the result f[a][b]
is some particular value c. Since we have three parameters a, b and c of the same
type, the number of cases we require to have a representative set is just 3!= 6. Here
is the declaration we use in SMV to split the problem into cases:
forall(i in TAG; a,b,c in WORD)
subcase lemma2[i][a][b][c]
of pout.val//lemma2[i]
for aux[i].opra = a & aux[i].oprb = b & f[a][b] = c;
Given this declaration, SMV will automatically apply symmetry reduction to reduce an
innite number of cases to just six representative ones. In addition, it will automatically
reduce the (possibly innite) type of data words to just the specic values a, b and c,
and an abstract value. Thus, in the worst case, when a, b and c are all dierent values,
the number of bits required to encode data words for the model checker is two. Thus,
we have reduced an innite state verication problem to a nite number of nite state
problems.
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6.7. Summary
The result of applying the above described proof decomposition is a set of proof
subgoals that can be solved by model checking (and which, if false, will yield sequen-
tial counterexamples). Our implementation of Tomasulo’s algorithm is veried for an
arbitrary (nite or innite) number of registers and reservation stations, for an arbitrary
(nite or innite) size data word, and for an arbitrary ALU function. It is also possible
to use similar techniques to verify it for an arbitrary number of execution units (this
requires one \noninterference lemma", which is not discussed here).
All told, there are 11 cases of the various lemmas to prove: two cases each for the
opra and oprb operand correctness, 6 cases for the result correctness, and one case
for the correctness of the data output (not discussed here). For the case of one execu-
tion unit, the largest model checking problem has 25 state variables. As a result, the
overall verication time (including the generation of proof goals and model checking)
is just under 4 CPU seconds (on SPARC Ultra II server). The verication time for
8 execution units is roughly 1 min. The time required for an experienced user of SMV
(the author) to write, debug and verify the proof was approximately 1 h and 10 min
(the design itself was already debugged and was previously formally veried using an
earlier methodology). 1
In summary, the basic strategy we used to reduce the verication problem to tractable
model checking problems was the following:
1. Renement relations and auxiliary state: We broke the problem into two parts,
by writing renement relations that specify the correct values for the operands and
results obtained in the implementation. To do this, the correct values are obtained
from the abstract model, and stored in auxiliary state.
2. Path splitting: We broke the large data structures (the register le and reservation
station array) down into just a few components by splitting cases on the path taken
by a data item from one renement relation to another.
3. Symmetry: The large number of cases produced by the above two steps are reduced
to a small nite number by considerations of symmetry.
4. Data-type reductions: After case splitting, we reduced the large (or innite) types,
such as data words, to small nite types, representing all the irrelevant values by a
single abstract value. A special case of this is the uninterpreted function abstraction,
in which we use a lookup table to represent and arbitrary function, then split cases
such that we use only one element of the table for each case.
1 Details of this example (and extending the proof to an arbitrary number of execution units) can be found
in a tutorial on SMV, included with the SMV software. At the time of this writing, the software and tutorial
can be downloaded from the following URL:
http://www-cad.eecs.berkeley.edu/~kenmcmil/smv.
300 K.L. McMillan / Science of Computer Programming 37 (2000) 279{309
6.8. Adding a re-order buer
Now, suppose that we modify the design to use a \re-order buer". This means that
instead of writing results to the register le when they are produced by an execution
unit, we store them in a buer, and write them back to the register le in program
order. This is usually done so that the processor can be returned to a consistent state
after an \exceptional" condition occurs, such as an arithmetic overow. The simplest
way to do this in the present implementation is to store the result in an extra eld res
of the reservation station, and then modify the allocation algorithm so that reservation
stations are allocated and freed in round-robin order. The result of an instruction is
written to the register le when its reservation station is freed.
Interestingly, after this change, the processor can be veried without modifying one
line of the proof! This is because our three lemmas (for operands, results and noninter-
ference) are not aected by the design change. This highlights an important dierence
between the present methodology and techniques such as [4, 5, 9, 13, 25, 30], which are
based on symbolic simulation. Because we are using model checking it is not necessary
to write inductive invariants of the design. Instead, we rely on model checking to com-
pute the strongest invariant of an abstracted model. Thus, our proof only species the
values of three key signals: the source operands in the reservation stations, the value
on the result bus and the tag on the result bus. Since the function of these signals
was not changed in adding the re-order buer, our proof is still valid. On the other
hand, if we had to write inductive invariants, these would involve in some way all
of the state holding variables. Thus, after changing the control logic and adding data
elds, we would have to modify the invariants. Of course, in some cases, such as very
simple pipelines, almost all states will be reachable, so the required invariant will be
quite simple. However, in the case of a system with more complex control (such as an
out-of-order processor), the invariants are nontrivial, and must be modied to reect
design changes. While this is not an obstacle in theory, in practice, a methodology that
requires less proof maintenance is a signicant advantage.
In the next section we will consider applications of the same basic strategy to other
hardware examples, with somewhat dierent characteristics.
7. Other applications
7.1. A packet buering application
The rst example is a component of the InfoPad wireless terminal [27] developed
at the University of California. In this hand-held device, a variety of multimedia data
sources and sinks, including a pen input device, speech input and output, a video
stream a graphics, are connected via an 8-bit bus. A component called the \transmit
multiplexer", implemented as an ASIC, is used to consolidate byte-at-a-time transfers
over the multiplexed bus into complete packets, sending the completed packets to an
K.L. McMillan / Science of Computer Programming 37 (2000) 279{309 301
Fig. 8. Path splitting in the InfoPad transmit multiplexer.
FPGA for encoding and eventual transmission by a wireless modem. Truman [28]
reports on the specication and verication of a model of this buering device, using
compositional model checking and a renement-based methodology. An earlier version
of SMV was used for this purpose. Here we consider not the specic proof in that
paper, but how the present methodology might be applied to the transmit buer, and
similar packet storage and forwarding devices. Nonetheless, the important ideas in the
proof are due to Truman.
In this case, the abstract model is extremely simple. It consists simply of a stream
of arbitrary packets to be sent by each source device. The streams are represented by
arrays, whose content is undened, except that it is constant in time. No operation is
performed on these arrays, since the system only transfers data and does not perform
any actual computation. Given that packet streams are presented appropriately at the
input of the transmit buer, we wish to show that the same data appears in an appro-
priate manner at the output. The manner of presentation of data at the input and output
is specied by renement relations. This situation is depicted in Fig. 8.
In order to specify the renement relations for input and output, we have to know
at any given time which data item from the abstract packet streams is currently being
transferred across the given interface. This information is obtained by attaching a tag
to each data item. The tags are auxiliary variables, not part of the design, but they
travel through the design along with the corresponding data, exactly as if they were
part of the real hardware. A tag indicates for a given data item exactly which byte of
which packet of which stream the data item derives from. Thus, given the tag and the
abstract model, we can always determine the correct value of the data item. Note that,
while in the previous example, we used the auxiliary state to store actual data values
from the abstract model, in this case, we store pointers into the abstract model instead.
Now we come to the proof decomposition. There are two large structures that we
have to consider when decomposing the problem. The rst is the set of abstract packet
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arrays. The second is the buer memory within the transmit multiplexer. This large
space of buer memory is used to store packets from the various sources while they are
being accumulated and waiting for transmission. As before, we can use path splitting
to break these large structures into their respective components. When verifying that a
data item at the output is correct according to its tag, we rst of all consider only the
case of one particular tag i. This corresponds to one particular data item in the abstract
model. Hence, all of the other items can be abstracted away in the proof. Second, we
consider only data items which have been stored in one particular cell of the buer
memory. As before, this means we may have to add some auxiliary state to remember
the storage location of the item currently being output. With this reduction, we can
consider only one cell of the buer memory and one data item in the abstract packet
stream. By declaring the index types for packet streams and the buer array to be
symmetric, we can reduce the number of cases to prove down to just one. Thus we
have reduced a problem of arbitrary size to a problem of xed nite size.
Having shown that all data items reaching the output of the transmit multiplexer are
correct, we also have to show that the items appear in the correct order. Note that this
property relates only to the tags and not to the data items themselves (this specication
is also part of the renement relations). Provided that the range of the tags is not too
large, this proof can be done directly by model checking. This is because the number
of states in the model, when data are excluded, is proportional simply to the number
of tags. Using induction (not discussed here) we can also show correct ordering for
innite streams of packets.
7.2. A cache coherent multiprocessor
Our nal example is a cache coherence protocol of a commercial multiprocessor,
and its implementation in an ASIC. The design and formal verication of the protocol,
and the portion of the ASIC that implements it, is reported by Eiriksson [8]. This
work was also done using an earlier version of SMV. Again, the purpose here is not
to describe Eiriksson’s proof, but to show how in outline the proof ts into the present
methodology.
The system in question consists of a collection of processors sharing a common
memory address space. Each processor stores a working set of memory locations in a
local cache. Consistency between these locally cached copies of memory locations is
maintained by a protocol, which sends messages over an unordered store-and-forward
network. The protocol itself was veried by model checking, using an abstract model of
the system. In this model, receiving a message and transmitting a response is modeled
as a single atomic event. This abstract model, once veried, is used as the basis to
specify and verify the implementation, by means of renement relations. This approach
is depicted in Fig. 9.
The implementation itself (described at the RTL level in the Verilog language) is
substantially more complex than the abstract model. The design contains, for example,
a collection of FIFO buers to handle incoming and outgoing messages, arbitration
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Fig. 9. Cache protocol renement verication.
logic to handle the routing of messages onto buses, a pipeline to handle the processing
of protocol state transitions, a content addressable memory (CAM) to store the state
of pending transactions by address, an intermediate storage memory for holding data
associated with pending transactions, and so on. All told the protocol is implemented
in roughly 30,000 lines of synthesizable Verilog.
The implementation logic is veried by writing renement relations that relate values
at certain points in the implementation with values in the abstract model. Once again,
to specify the correct value of data items at any point in the design, we add auxiliary
state to the model. The auxiliary variables in this case are tags that indicate which
protocol message in the abstract model a given data item is associated with. These tags
move through the system along with the corresponding data. This makes it possible to
specify, at a given time and place, what the correct value of a given data item is. This
in turn allows us to break a large design into pieces of tractable size for verication,
and verify each piece in the context of the abstract model.
As in the previous example, there are also several large data structures that need to be
decomposed by path splitting. The most important of these is the memory itself, which
we divide into its elements by considering the correctness of only those transactions
relating to one particular memory address. Similarly, to handle large FIFO buers,
we consider the correctness of only data items that pass through a particular cell of
the circular buer that implements the FIFO. To handle the CAM that holds the state
of pending transactions, we consider only those transactions that fall into a particular
cell of the CAM, and so on. As before, symmetry considerations then can be used to
reduce the number of proof obligations to a tractable level. For example, the memory
addresses are symmetric, as are CAM indices, and the message buers in the abstract
model that represent the store-and-forward network. Data type reductions can then be
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used to reduce the large types, such as addresses, to a small number of values, for any
given case.
Thus the cache coherence system is veried by applying the same basic proof
methodology as in the previous examples.
8. Related work
This work is chiey concerned with combining a set of proof techniques into a
methodology for system level formal verication in the hardware domain. Many of
the individual techniques used in this methodology are related to techniques in the
literature, and we consider some of these connections here.
We begin with the circular compositional method. Compositional methods in the
temporal framework were originally described in terms of an \assumption=guarantee"
paradigm [22]. Each component of a system was to be specied by those temporal
properties which it assumes about its environment, and those temporal properties which
it will guarantee, provided the assumptions hold. Thus, if a given process assumes P
and guarantees Q, then if we compose it with a process that guarantees P (under
no assumptions), we can infer Q. This is essentially no dierent from Hoare logic,
except in that the formulas are temporal, and composition of programs is parallel
rather than sequential. However, this temporal aspect introduces a serious diculty.
That is, when composing two processes A and B, it is often necessary to assume
correctness of A to verify B and vice versa. This is not a problem in Hoare logic,
since for a sequential program, we do not require that the guarantees made by A and
B hold simultaneously. The inference rule for the \while" statement in eect allows
us to construct circular proofs. In the parallel case, however, both specications A
and B must hold simultaneously, and thus a proof may not be circular. In practice,
we may easily nd that there is no place to begin a non-circular assume=guarantee
proof, because no process satises any useful properties in the absence of environment
assumptions.
This \environment" problem was recognized by Abadi and Lamport [1]. They showed
the somewhat surprising fact that under certain restrictions on the processes and on the
temporal properties to be proved, if one can prove P assuming Q and prove Q assum-
ing P, then both P and Q must hold. To simplify somewhat, these restrictions were
essentially as follows: (1) the processes must modify disjoint subsets of the system
variables in an interleaved manner, and (2) each property must be a safety property
and restrict only state variables of one process. Given these assumptions, one can show
that the truth of P at time t cannot depend on Q holding at any time later than t−1,
and vice versa. Thus, P and Q are proved in eect by mutual induction over time. This
argument would not hold, however, if either P or Q contained operators that refer to
the future. The technique is thus restricted to safety properties (in temporal logic, the
properties expressible in the form Gp, where p is a past-time formula). Alur and Hen-
zinger [2] extended this approach to the case where the processes and properties are
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both represented by synchronous Mealy machines (a method embodied in the Mocha
system [3]). This relaxes the requirement of interleaving concurrency, but still allows
only safety properties to be veried.
Nonetheless, mutual dependence of liveness properties does occur in real systems.
Consider, for example, the problem of multiple execution units in an instruction set
processor. At some times, the instruction in unit A may depend on the result of the
instruction in unit B, and at other times the inverse relation may hold. Thus, in order to
prove that unit A is live (always eventually produces a result), we must assume that B
is live, and vice versa. An example of such a liveness proof can be found in [19]. The
technique of circular compositional proofs used here allows for this kind of circular
reasoning, even about liveness properties. In essence, it makes explicit the induction
over time implied in the above approach, by assuming property P only up to time t−1
when proving Q at time t, and vice versa. As we have seen, since this condition (Q
up to t−1 implies P up to t) is expressible in temporal logic, the local proof subgoals
generated by a circular compositional proof can be veried by model checking.
The technique of temporal case splitting can be viewed as simply a temporal version
of the \excluded middle" principle. Thus it undoubtedly has many precedents in earlier
systems. What is possibly new about this technique is that, rather than splitting a proof
into cases based on the truth of a proposition, one splits into cases based on the set
of times at which a variable has a particular value. More particularly, the notion of
splitting up a proof into cases based on the path a data item takes through a system
appears to be novel, at least insofar as its application to model checking is concerned.
The use of symmetric types to infer symmetry in a design has its roots in the
Murphi verication system [12]. However, in Murphi, the symmetry is used to reduce
the size of the state space, while here it is used to reduced the number of cases of a
parameterized property that must be veried.
The technique of data-type reduction presented here is a special case of abstract
interpretation [6]. It is related to reductions based on data independence [32] in that
large data types are reduced to small nite ones by using a few specic values and an
extra value to represent the remaining elements of the type. However, the technique
does not require control to be independent of data. For example, it allows control to
depend on comparisons of data items. This is signicant, in that the technique can
be applied to reduce addresses, tags and pointers, which are commonly compared to
determine control behavior. Also, the technique reduces not only the data types in
question, but also any arrays indexed by these types. This makes it possible to reduce
systems with large or unbounded memory arrays, register les, FIFO buers, etc., to
a small nite size.
Lazic and Roscoe [15] also describe a technique for reducing systems with un-
bounded arrays to nite systems for verication, under certain restrictions. Their tech-
nique is a complete procedure for verifying a particular property (determinism). It
works by identifying a nite conguration of a system, whose determinism implies
determinism of any larger congurations. The technique presented here, on the other
hand, is not restricted to a particular property or class of properties. More importantly,
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the method of [15] does not allow equality comparison of values stored in arrays,
nor the storage of array indices in arrays. Thus, it cannot be applied to, for example,
unbounded cache memories, content-addressable memories, or the example presented
here, an out-of-order processor that stores tags (i.e., array indices) in arrays, and com-
pares them for equality. It should be noted, in fact, that comparing values stored in
an unbounded array, or even including one bit of status information in elements of
an unbounded array, is sucient to make reachability analysis undecidable. Unfortu-
nately, these conditions are ubiquitous in hardware design. Thus, while the technique
presented here is incomplete, being based on a conservative abstraction, this incom-
pleteness should be viewed as inevitable if we wish to verify hardware designs for
unbounded resources.
Data-type reduction has also been described previously by Long [17] in his work
on automatically generating abstractions. However, that work applied only to concrete
nite types. Here, data-type reductions are used in combination with symmetry and case
splitting, to allow the reduction of types of arbitrary or innite size to nite types. In
addition, Long’s work did not treat the reduction of arrays. What makes it possible
to do this with the present technique is the combination of data-type reductions with
temporal case splitting and symmetry reductions, a combination which appears to be
novel.
The use of uninterpreted functions here is also substantially dierent from previous
applications. The basic reason for using uninterpreted functions is the same { to ab-
stract away from the actual functions computed on data in order to reason separately
about arithmetic and data ow. However, existing techniques using uninterpreted func-
tions, such as [4, 5, 9, 13, 25, 30] are based essentially on symbolic simulation. In these
methodologies, one attempts to prove a commutative diagram. In the simplest case,
one shows that, from any state, applying an abstraction function and then a step of
the specication model is equivalent to applying a step of the implementation model
and then the abstraction function. However, since not all states are reachable, in gen-
eral, the user must provide an inductive invariant on the state space. The commutative
diagram is proved only for those states satisfying the invariant. By contrast, in the
present technique, uninterpreted functions are used in the context of temporal veri-
cation (i.e., model checking). In this case, there is no need to provide an inductive
invariant, since the model checker is proving that a given temporal property holds at
the initial state, rather than that a commutative diagram holds at every state. In eect,
we are relying on the model checker’s ability to compute the strongest invariant (i.e.,
the set of reachable states) rather than supplying an invariant by hand. Note that in
general, when uninterpreted functions with equality are added to temporal logic, the
resulting logic is undecidable. The technique presented here is not a decision procedure
for such a logic, but rather a technique of reduction to propositional temporal logic that
is necessarily incomplete. Others have presented a semi-decision procedure for such a
logic [10], however this technique is sound only in a very restricted case; for most
problems of practical interest, the procedure is not sound, and can only be used as a
heuristic to nd counterexamples.
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Finally, a number of authors report the use of general purpose proof assistants,
without model checking, in processor verication (for example [7, 11, 23, 31]).
To conclude, the methods presented here are novel in several aspects: rst the par-
ticular methods of circular compositional proof, symmetry reduction, and data type
reduction and the method of handling uninterpreted functions are novel in and of
themselves. Second, the combination of these techniques into a methodology for hard-
ware verication is novel. Finally, the implementation of all these techniques into a
mechanical proof system based on symbolic model checking is novel.
9. Conclusion
We have seen that a proof strategy based on a few simple, somewhat domain specic
proof techniques can be used to break the verication of a large and complex hardware
system down into a tractable number of nite state subgoals, with few enough state
variables to be veried by model checking.
This strategy appears to be reasonably generic, in that it can be applied, for example,
to such diverse hardware applications as out-of-order instruction set processors, cache
coherence systems and packet handlers for communication systems. It allows these
designs to be veried at both an abstract level, and at the \RTL" level. From this level,
designs may be either synthesized directly into logic gates, or compared to gate level
designs using combination equivalence tools [14]. The methodology has in practice been
applied to a very large design in a commercial design environment [8]. Nonetheless,
there is no evidence to indicate that application of the methodology to additional designs
will not reveal weaknesses which would require the incorporation of additional proof
techniques. For example, the notion of data-type reduction has already been extended to
support an inductive data-type, which allows incrementation (i.e., a successor function)
as well as equality comparison. This can be used, for example, to show that a FIFO
buer delivers an innite sequence of packets in the correct order. Thus, the system
described here should be viewed as a work in progress.
In essence, the methodology presented here is an attempt to combine in a practical
way the strengths of model checking and theorem proving. The renement relation
approach, combined with the various available reductions and model checking, makes
it possible to avoid writing detailed assertions about every state holding component
of the design, and also to avoid interactively generated proof scripts. In this way, the
manual eort of proofs is reduced. In particular, the model checker’s ability to compute
the strongest invariant of a model is pervasively exploited to avoid writing inductive
invariants of the system by hand. The proofs thus obtained, involving less design detail,
are arguably less vulnerable to small changes in the design. This is illustrated by the
example of adding a re-order buer to an implementation of Tomasulo’s algorithm,
while reusing without modication the original proof. On the other hand, the ability
of theorem proving to break large proofs down into smaller ones is exploited to avoid
model checking’s strict limits on model size. Thus, by combining the strengths of
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these two methods, we may arrive at a scalable methodology for formal hardware
verication.
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